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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MIDVALE MOTORS, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MELVIN J. SAUNDERS and WANDA 
TALBOT SAUNDERS, his wife, et al., 
Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
11146 
Appeal from the judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, in favor of 
Robert M. McRae, not a party to this action, and 
against the Plaintiff, Midvale Motors, Inc. 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge 
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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MIDVALE MOTORS, INC., a Utah corpora- 'I 
ti on, 
Plaintiff and Appelbnt, 
vs. 
MELVIN J. SAUNDERS and WANDA 
TALBOT SAUNDERS, his wife, et al., 
Defendants. J 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11146 
This is an appeal from the judgment order 
dated November 30th, 1967, in which the respond-
ent, Robert M. McRae, received a judgment for a 
total sum of $881.76 representing attorney's fees for 
certain services performed by the said Robert M. 
McRae and for costs advanced by him in handling 
certain work for Midvale Motors, Inc., the appellant 
in this case. In addition to fixing the above named 
amount for attorney's fees and costs, the judgment 
order of November 30th, 1967 fixed a judgment lien 
on the file and real property which is the subject 
matter of the plaintiff's cause of action. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT 
On October 23rd, 1967, pursuant to a motion o' 
Robert M. McRae, the former attorney of appellant 
herein, an order was entered giving permission 
the said Rebe+ M. McRae to withdraw as counst: 
of record for the plaintiff corporation, and further 
fixing attorney's fees for services performed by the 
said Robert M. McRae in the sum of $750.00 and in 
addition the sum of $134.76 was awarded to the sak 
Robert M. McRae for costs advanced in connectior. 
with the prosecution of the said case. A further pro 
vision of the order placed an attorney's fee lien on 
the files and property which is the subject of th1s 
action. 
Thereafter, on November 29th, 1967, pursuant 
to plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the order, a hearin0 
was held in which the plaintiff attempted to have the 
order set aside pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Pre 
cedure, Rule 60 (b) (1) and (7), in which the plaintili 
alleged that to its knowledge it did not receive c : 
notice of the Motion for Determining Attorney's fee0 , 
although admittedly the file purports that a copy ! 
the said notice was mailed to the plaintiff. At the'. i 
hearing the motion of the plaintiff was denied anc · 
a judgment order was entered on the 30th dc:y 0 i 
November, 1967 reitirating the previous order tha 1 
had been entered awarding the sum of $881.76 ~,:I 
'·I 
the said Robert M. McRae representing attorneY 0 ! 
fees and costs advanced to prosecute this action. 1 
Thereafter. the plaintiff filed Objections to Fino 
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3 
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Motion to 
Vacate the Judgment. The sa.id Motion to Vacate 
Judqment was heard on the 29th day of December, 
1967 and the plaintiff's motion was denied. Plaintiff 
appeals from the said judqment order entered on 
the 30th day of November, 1967. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment 
order of November 30th, 1967 and the dismissal of 
this action. 
FACTS 
On August 17th, 1965, the respondent, Robert 
M. McRae, the then attorney for the appellant, Mid-
vale Motors, Inc., filed a complaint against Melvin J. 
Saunders. W anrla Talbot Saunders, his wife, and 
Thomas J. Ivester. The action was brought under a_ 
Uniform Real Estate Contract into which the Saun-
ders and Ivester had entered covering certain real 
property in Kearns, Utah. The complaint asked for 
two of the remedies available under the said Uni-
form Real Estate Contract, to-wit: money damages 
of $100.00 per month which was the sum called for 
1 in the Uniform Real Estate Contract as payments on 
the house, plus the amount of $4.00 per month as 
: late charges for delinquent payments, or a total sum 
! of $832.00; the complaint also sought to have the 
Possession of the property turned over to the plaint-
iff, Midvale Motors, Inc. 
In answering the complaint, the defendants 
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tendered possession of the house to the plaintifi. 
Thereafter. the trial court ruled that the plaintiff was 
foreclosed from seeking money damages on the 
theory that the tender of possession of the property 
to the plaintiff had foreclosed it from seeking any o! 
the alternative remedies called for in the contracl, 
and that it was entitled only to possession. 
The case was appealed and on appeal this 
Court ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to take any 
of the alternative remedies up to the time of actual 
trial in the matter, and that the defendants could noi 
choose which of the remedies the plaintiff would 
seek. The case was then remanded for further pro-
ceedings in accordance with the instructions of this 
Court. Midvale Motors v. Saunders, 432 P. 2d 3/ 
(Utah 1967). 
At that time Robert M. McRae sought to with· / 
draw as counsel for the plaintiff and permission by· 
the Court was given to withdraw and attorney's fees 
were fixed as has been stated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
A JUDGMENT TO THE RESPONDENT, ROB-
ERT M. McRAE, AND AGAINST THE PLAINT-
IFF, MIDVALE MOTORS, INC., FOR THE 
REASON THAT ROBERT M. McRAE IS NOT 
A PARTY TO THIS ACTION. 
It should be made clear from the beginning tha' 
this is not a situation in which a successful plaint::: . 
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goes to court for the fixing of reasonable attorney's 
fees to be collected from an unsuccessful defendant 
in accordance with the provisions of a contract call-
ing for the defendant to pay attorney's fees if a court 
action is necessary in order to enforce that contrnct. 
This is a situation in which an attorney has, by mo-
tion, had the amount of attorney's fees to be collect-
ed from his own client fixed by the Court. Under 
such a procedure there is no opportunity for the 
client to object to the amount of attorney's fees and 
if he feels that the amount is excessive have a fact 
determination before a trial of fact as to the reason-
able amount of the said attorney's fees. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3, 
states: 
"A civil action is comr,rnnced (1) by filing a com-
plaint with the Court, or (2) by the service of a 
summons." 
In this class the respondent, Robert M. McRae, now 
has a judgment against his own client without ever 
having gone to the bother of sending to his client 
a statement of the amount of money owing and due 
for his services and if the client objects, suing the 
client in a court of law in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
At the hearing held on the 29th day of Novem-
ber, 1967, pursuant to plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside 
Order, the attorney for the plaintiff moved the court 
for a dismissal of this action on the basis that it was 
not brought in accordance with the Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure. For some reason the motion of thio 
plaintiff was not recorded in the transcript, and pagio 
9 of the transcript states: "Further arguments ol 
counsel not recorded." Appellant does not know ths 
reason for ihe omission of this part of the record bu: 
wishes this motion of the appellant before the courl 
as part of said :2cord. 
It is therefore maintained by the appellant thal 
the procedure by which Mr. McRae has obtained a 
judgment against his own client for attorney's fees 
is not in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civ1! 
Procedure, and that the case should be dismissed 
on that basis, and if Mr. McRae then wishes to bill 
his former client for the amount he claims is the 
reasonable value of his services, he may do so, and 
may also, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, file an action by serving a summonsand 
complaint upon the plaintiff for the amount he 
claims, should the plaintiff fail to pay the same. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
A JUDGMENT TO ROBERT M. McRAE 
WHEN THE PARTIES HAD STIPULATED 
THAT THE PRIOR ORDER COULD BE SET 
ASIDE AND MR. McRAE OFFERED NO EVI-
DENCE OF THE REASONABLENESS OF HIS 
CLAIMED ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The transcript of proceedings at page 9 shows 
the following statement of Mr. Robert M. McRae: 
"May I give a statement? Can the entire matter be 
resolved at this time if the Judge is willing?" The 
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7 
findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in 
lh1s matter and signed on the 30th day of Novem-
ber, 1967, contain the following: 
"Plaintiff's present counsel, William J. Anderson, 
and Robert M. McRae stipulated in open court that 
the entire mGtter concerninJ the motion of Rob2rt 
M. McRae and the motion of plaintiff to vacate the 
order of October 23, 1967, could be heard at this 
time." 
Plaintiff contends that this stipulation could 
hav0 no other meaning than that the matter of the 
motion of Robert M. McRae to fix attorney's fees 
could be heard at that time. This was, in effect, a 
stipulation that the order of October 23rd, 1967, 
could be set aside and that the Motion of Robert M. 
McRae could then be heard at that time. It was then 
the burden of Robert M. McRae to offer evidence 
a.t that hearing on the matter of ~he reasonableness 
of attorney's fees and to allow the plaintiff an op-
portunity to rebut any evidence which he may then 
have offered. His failure to do so could leave the 
court no other alternative but to deny Mr. McRae's 
motion to fix attorney's fees. In Hatch v. Sugarhouse 
Finance Company, 434 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1967), it 
is stated: 
"It is generally held that only a lmvyer can know 
the value of legal services rendered, and it would 
seem that no great inconvenience to a plaintiff law-
yer would result in having- proof made in open court 
as to the reasonable value of his services rendered, 
for he would be subject to cross examination and 
where other witnesses may offer contradictory evi-
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dence. Certainly the client must feel better if the 
fee is fixed upon evidence given in court rather 
than by fiat of the lawyer." 
It is submitted that there is no evidence on rec-
ord other than that of the hearing of October 23rd, 
1967 as to the reasonable value of the services o! 
Robert M. Mcflae. As has been seen above, the or-
der entered in that hearing was set aside by stipu· · 
lation of the parties and the evidence produced by 
Mr. McRae at that time has no evidentiary value cts 
to the reasonable value of his services. 
Therefore, it is contended by the appellant that 
plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the order entered pur-
suant to the hearing of October 23rd, 1967, was 
granted and that since Mr. McRae produced no evi· 
dence at that point the judge should have ruled in 
favor of the plaintiff and denied Robert M. McRae's 
Motion to Fix Attorney's Fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The action of Robert M. McRae to have attor· 
ney's fees fixed as against his own client should be 
dismissed and if Mr. McRae then wishes to bring an 
action in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, he may be free to do so. 
Further it is clear from the record that the Mo· 
tion of the ~]aintiff to set aside the order fixing a.I 
torney's fees wJ.s. by stipulation, granted, and that 
the failure of Robert M. McRae to produce evidence 
of the reasonable value of his services required the 
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9 
court to grant the motion of the plaintiff to set aside 
the order and that Robert M. McRae's motion of Oc-
tober 23rd. 1967 was then and there heard and 
should have been denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William J. Anderson 
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke 
& Vincent 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
Midvale Motors, Inc. 
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